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NOTES AND COMMENT

The New.York State Tax Law, in.its efforts to achieve as much
uniformity as possible with the federal laws in matters of estate taxes,
has followed the federal courts on this question. 18 Prior to September 1, 1930, however, this type of transfer was not subject to tax
under New York law. 14
How remote must the possibility of reversion be in order to constitute the transfer an absolute and complete gift during the lifetime
of the transferor and hence not subject to the Estate Tax? Attempts
have been made to draw a fine line between what constitutes a possibility so remote as to be equivalent to no possibility at all, and what
constitutes a reasonable possibility.1 5 Even if a hard and fast line
were set by statute or by the courts, it would still be exceedingly
difficult to place many such trusts or other transfers on one side of
the line or the other. The facts will differ in each case as they have
in the past. The laws applicable to trusts will still, as they do now,
vary from state to state. The Federal Government, in interpreting any trust agreement is bound, in most instances, to take into
account the laws of the state in which the agreement was drawn.1 6
More than three quarters of an estate may be eaten up by estate
taxes alone where the estate is big enough 17 and it is in the larger
estates that inter vivos transfers are most common. The stakes being
high, litigation ensues only too frequently.
The question as yet unresolved is certain to appear in the courts
again and again.
NEWCOMB. B. PINEs.

ADEmPriON BY A COMMITTEE OF AN INSANE TESTATOR

The conflict in the United States concerning the orrect rule in
ademption by a committee of an insane testator was manifested by the
Illinois case of Lewis v. Hill, decided in 1944.1 This case 2affirmed
what is considered to be the majority ruling in such actions.
Matter of Cregan, 275 N. Y. 337, 9 N. E. (2d) 953 (1937).
'14 Estate of Isabelle C. Kirby v. State Tax Commission, 228 App. Div. 171,
239 N. Y. Supp. 390 (1930) ; Matter of Schweinert, 133 Misc. 762, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 307 (1929).
15 Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48, 56 Sup. Ct. 78 (1935);
13

Commissioner v. Kellogg, 119 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
16 Sharpe's Estate v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945);
Vaccaro v. United States 149 F. (2d) 1014 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945) ; Commissioner
v. Porter, 148 F. (2d) ?66 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
17 Federal Estate Tax rates range as high as 20% basic tax and 77% addi-

tional tax. The New York Estate Tax ranges as high as 20%.

(See INT.

Ray. CODE §§ 810 and 935; N. Y. TAx LAW § 249n.)
ILewis v. Hill, 387 II. 542, 56 N. E. (2d) 619 (1944).
2 Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 Fed. 896, 28 L. R. A. (N. s.) 401 (1910);
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Ademption has been defined as the extinction or satisfaction of a
legacy by some act of the testator which is equivalent to a revocation
of the bequest, or which indicates an intention to revoke. 3 Of necessity, it takes place only when the legacy is specific.4 However, intention is no longer the criterion and there are many instances where
ademption has been completed without the intention of the testator,
as for example, in destruction of the property, 5 material alteration in
6
its substance,
or appropriation of the property by operation of the
7
law.
In the early English decisions, the courts looked to the intention
of the testator to-discover whether the ademption had taken place, that
is, whether the testator intended to revoke his gift by disposing of the
property before his death.8 This rule was soon discarded in favor of
what was considered a better test, that is, whether the thing was still
in existence in the estate. 9 The American courts 10 have followed the
English decisions 11 in observing this rule, the reasoning behind it
being that after the property has been destroyed, changed or taken,
the testator still has an opportunity to change his will, and if he fails

see National Board v. Fry, 293 Mo. 399, 239 S. W. 519 (1922); Matter of
Cooper's Estate, 95 N. J. Eq. 210, 123 At. 45 (1923); Morse v. Converse,
80 N. H. 24, 113 Atl. 214 (1921); Lamkin v. Kaiser, 256 S. W. 558 (Mo.
App. 1923); World's Gospel Union v. Barnes' Estate, 162 Mich. 79, 127 N. W.
37 (191Q)
; also see annotation in 30 A. L. R. 676 (1924).
3
Kenaday v. Sinnott, 179 U. S. 606, 45 L. ed. 339, 21 S. Ct. 233 (1900);
Burnham v. Comfort, 108 N. Y. 535, 15 N. E. 710 (1888). For an interesting
history and criticism of the rule of ademption see Page, Ademption by Extinctiont (1943) 1943 Wis. L. RFv. 11.
4 Thayer v. Paulding, 200 Mass. 98, 85 N. E. 868 (1908); In re Blomdahl's Will, 216 Wis. 590, 257 N. W. 152 (1934).
5 Brady v. Brady, 78 Md. 461, 28 Atl. 515 (1894); see Elwyn v. De
Garmendia, 148 Md. 109, 128 Ad. 913 (1925); Donath v. Shaw, 132 N. J. Eq.
545, 29 At. (2d) 555 (1942).
6 Matter of Brann, 219 N. Y. 263, 114 N. E. 404 (1916) ; Welch v. Welch,
147 Miss. 728, 113 So. 197 (1927); First National Bank of Boston v. Perkins
Institute for the Blind, 275 Mass. 498, 176 N. E. 532 (1931).
7 Ametrano v. Downs, 62 App. Div. 405, 70 N. Y. Supp. 833 (2d Dep't
1901).
8 Chapman v. Hart, 1 Ves. Sr. 27 (1749); Patridge v. Patridge, Cas. t.
Tab. 226 (1736); Drinkwater v. Falconer, 2 Ves. 623, 28 Eng. Rep. 397
(1755).
9 Ashburner v. Macguire, 2 Bro. C. C. 108 (1786). The rule however
was best stated in Stanley v. Potter, 2 Cox 180 (1789), by Lord Thurlow who
said, "I believe it will be a safer and clearer way to adhere to the plain rule
which I before mentioned which is to inquire whether the specific thing remains or not."
10 First National Bank of Boston v. Perkins Institute for the Blind, 275
Mass. 498, 176 N. E. 532 (1931); Ametrano v. Downs, 62 App. Div. 405, 70
N. Y. Supp. 833 (2d Dep't 1901); Oven v. Busiel, 83 N. H. 345, 142 Atl. 692
(1928) ; Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. 301 (1853) ; Rogers v. Rogers, 67 So. Car.
168, 45 S. E. 176, 100 Am. St. Rep. 721 (1903).
11 Harrison v. Jackson, 7 Ch. D. 399 (1877); In re Brandle, 4 C. P. D.
336 (1879) ; It re Bick, 1 Ch. 488 (1921).
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to do so the presumption is raised that the testator wished nothing to
go to the legatee.
Difficulty with the foregoing rule is found in those cases where
the testator after having made a valid will is precluded by insanity
from making another. Property, which he had devised in the valid
will, is sold to support him by his guardians while he is in the insane
state. The testator thereafter dies, precluded from having revised
his testamentary disposition by his mental derangement. Under a
strict interpretation of the rules of ademption, the beneficiary receives
nothing, the property being adeemed by the act of the testator's
guardians.
In England these cases were considered as ademption when done
by authorized persons.12 However, where the person acted without
authority, it was maintained that no ademption had taken place and
the beneficiary could recover.13 The situation was remedied by the
enactment of a statute which revised the common law and specifically
excepted acts of an insane testator's committee from adeeming property which he had previously bequeathed, so that the beneficiary could
or the residue if
recover a like amount representing the property,
14
some had been used in the testator's support.
The legislatures of American states have not followed this English enactment, and therefore courts have been pressed for a suitable
rule which would allow the beneficiary to recover. They have sustained the beneficiary's right for a variety of reasons. The following
are representative of the ratio decidendi, used to sustain the beneficiary's right to take: 1) At the last moment when the testator could
make a valid disposition of the property, the legacy was still in existence.15 2) The committee, in adeeming the property, would be
acting contrary to the last express wish of the person whose interests
and desires they were appointed to safeguard and carry out. By this
act they would be permitted to swell the residuary estate at the expense of one whom the testator specifically wished to benefit. 3) The
possibility of fraud would be enhanced where the conservator, or persons on the committee close to the testator, knowing of the provisions

12Jones v. Green, L. R. 5 Eq. 555 (1868);

In re Freer, Ch. D. 622

(1882).
3

'1 Jenkins v. Jones, L. R. 2 Eq. 323 (1866) ;'Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Hare
475, 68 Eng. Rep. 1014 (1853).
'14 LUNACY AcT OF 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 5, § 120(1) : A lunatic, his heirs,

executors, administrators, next of kin, devisees, legatees and assigns, shall have
the same interest in any moneys arising from any sale, mortgage or other disposition under the powers of this act which may not have been applied under
such powers, as he or they would have had in the property the subject of the
sale, mortgage or disposition, if no sale, mortgage or disposition, had been
made and the surplus moneys shall be of the same nature as the property sold,
mortgaged or disposed of.
Is Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 Fed. 896 (1910); cert. denied, Wilmerton
v. Wilmerton, 217 U. S. 606, 30 Sup. Ct. 696, 54 L. ed. 900 (1910).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ Vor.. 20

of his will, could favor one legatee over another by choosing the property to be sold. 10
The Illinois court upheld the beneficiary's right in- the case of
Lewis v. Hill,'7 mentioned previously. In this action, the testatrix,
Sarah Collins, devised certain real estate to Edith Lewis, the plaintiff.
Subsequently, the testatrix was adjudged incompetent, and the defendant, T. C. Hill, was appointed her conservator. The devised property was included by the defendant in an inventory of the assets of
the testatrix and the former applied to the court for an order to sell
the property in order to pay the expense of maintaining the testatrix
in a home. The property was sold, but before any of the proceeds of
the sale were used in her support the testatrix died and the defendant
was appointed executor of the estate. Plaintiff brought suit against
both the defendant and the residuary legatee, to secure an order to
turn over to the plaintiff the proceeds of the sale. The court sustained the plaintiff by saying that the fund remained impressed with
the nature of the realty, and that the committee could not adeem the
property.
The jurisdictions of Pennsylvania,' Vermont,' 9 and New York 20
have followed a contrary doctrine; the case of In re Ireland being the
outstanding New York decision. 2 ' The court held that the legatee
of a specific devise of stock was not allowed to recover the cash balance representing the stock which had been sold by a committee of
the insane testator, and which went instead to the residuary legatee.
The basis of this holding was that the stock had been adeemed, since
the change in the nature of the property had been material.
The court went on to say that intent of the testator is no longer
a guide but rather that the primary consideration is whether the property is an actual asset of the estate at the demise of the testator. Here
the shares of stock having been converted into cash, the legacy was
considered adeemed. The court felt obliged to follow this rule in
the absence of a statutory enactment, since they could not change a
specific legacy into a general one by judicial fiat. They also pointed
out that England had remedied the situation by the statute 2 and in
cases of the sale of real property of infants and incompetents a statute
has already been enacted 23 which keeps the money from changing
from realty until the infancy or incompetency is removed. It has been
is Id. at 900.
Lewis v. Hill, 387 II1.542, 56 N. E. (2d) 619 (1944).
is Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. 301 (1853).
19it re Barrow's Estate, 103 Vt. 501, 156 Atl. 408 (1931).
20 In re Ireland, 257 N. Y. 155, 177 N. E. 405 (1931).
6 ST. JonN's L. REv. 147, (1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 623,
21 Notes (1931)
(1931) 65 N. Y. U. L. Q. 506. See the excellent note in (1932) 45 HaRv. L.
REv.22 710.
LUNAcY AcT or 1890. supra note 15.
23 N. Y. Civ. PRac. AcT § 1042 which provides that the proceeds of a sale
of real property of an infant or insane person remain property of the same
17
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held under this statute that the character of a fund realized from the
sale of real estate remained realty so that the devisee of such property
could recover the proceeds less expenses.2 4 It would seem, therefore, that under the influence of this statute the real property of an
incompetent could not be adeemed by his committee if he died in his
insane state.
The decision in the Ireland case reversed a well considered previous New York Supreme Court holding.2 5 The rule is indeed harsh
and follows the idea of ademption to the extreme. It was worked out
by the courts to give effect to the probable intention of the testator,
up by defeating the intention more than it has given
and has ended
28

effect to it.

However much we may disagree, with th6 Ireland case, it must
be considered as the present law in New York.27 We should be interested, therefore, in ways in which the situation may be remedied and
in avoiding the creation of similar ones. Statutory enactment is probably the only method which is a satisfactory remedy, although the
statutes passed in sister states have not been as satisfactory as the
English statutes.2 8
Until such time as the legislature enacts such a statute or statutes
covering the situation, the burden falls on the draftsman of the will.
As with so many instances in the law the power to remedy the situation lies with the person making the instrument. If we keep in mind,
in drafting the will, the possibility of insanity, we will clear the first
hurdle in eliminating situations like the Ireland case. Normally demonstrative legacies carry out the testator's wishes as well as specific
legacies. 2 9 If the testator wishes to make the bequest only in specie
then an alternate should be added. We have left, then, only those
few instances wherein the testator desires that nothing should pass to
the legatee if the specific property he devised is not in existence at the
time of his death. A person making a will, either failing to comprehend the problem or neglecting to provide for it, may undergo great
expense and infinite thought and yet not give effect to the omnipresent
human motive to provide for the natural objects of his bounty.
GFa.ARD P. OHLERT.

nature until infant reaches full age or incompetency is removed. Act is construed in Matter of Garlick's Estate, 96 Misc. 653, 151 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1916).
24 Snedeker v. Ellis, 136 Misc. 607, 241 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1930).
25 Matter of Carter, 71 Misc. 406, 130 N. Y. Supp. 201 (1911).
26 See Page's article, Ademption by Extinction (1943) 1943 Wis. L. Ray.
11, 38. See Professor Warren's article, The History of Ademption (1940) 25
IowA L. Rav. 270, 324. He believes the rule of ademption is outmoded and
should be revised.
27 In the recent case of In re Anslinger's Estate, 185 Misc. 827, 831, 57 N. Y.
S. (2d) 466, 470 (1945), the Ireland case was cited with approval.
28 Collected statutes and difficulties surrounding such enactments are discussed in Page, Ademptiorn by Extinction (1943) 1943 Wis. L. REv. 11, 33.
29 See When Legacy Is Demonstrative (1920) 6 A. L. L 1353.

